The Business of Diplomacy

Jared Kushner is shaping foreign policy while raising billions

In late April, when the White House announced that envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff would travel to Pakistan for talks with Iran’s foreign minister, financial markets reacted almost immediately.

Oil futures dropped. Shipping insurance rates in the Persian Gulf eased. Not because a breakthrough was imminent, but because investors were looking for any sign that the stalemate might break, and the mere prospect of Trump’s son-in-law getting on a plane was enough to signal that something might shift in America’s escalating confrontation with Iran.

The golden son-in-law

Jared Kushner occupies a space that didn’t really exist in previous administrations: not quite a government official, not quite a private actor, but capable of influencing both. His return to the center of high-stakes diplomacy reflects more than personal trust. It reflects a broader shift in how this White House approaches the business of peace.

Kushner’s first stretch in the White House gave him something few outsiders ever acquire: direct, sustained relationships with some of the most powerful leaders in the Middle East.

From the outset, Kushner, then a real estate developer and the publisher of The New York Observer, was more than a campaign aide — he was one of Trump’s closest confidants, playing a central role in the 2016 campaign and transition and helping shape some of the president’s most consequential decisions. Then, as a senior adviser in Trump’s first term, he was handed an unusually expansive portfolio, including responsibility for some of the region’s most sensitive diplomatic tracks. He had no formal diplomatic background. But he had something that, in this administration, often mattered more — a direct line to the president and the latitude to operate outside traditional channels.

Kushner, who is Jewish, already had close ties with Israeli political and business leaders through his family’s real estate empire. Those relationships produced tangible results, most notably the normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states that became the signature diplomatic achievement of Trump’s first term. Just as important, they established him as someone who could navigate high-level negotiations and deliver outcomes in an environment where access often matters as much as expertise.

That credibility did not fade when he left the government. It hardened into something more durable. When Kushner stepped out of the White House, he profited from the network he had built.

The promises — and what followed

Since leaving the White House in 2021, Jared Kushner has raised roughly $4.8 billion for his private equity firm, Affinity Partners. The greatest share of that capital comes from sovereign wealth funds of Gulf Arab states — the same ones where he once operated as a key diplomatic interlocutor.

His firm invests in technology, financial services, and infrastructure, backing US and Israeli companies seeking to expand into markets across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia — a strategy that relies heavily on the regional relationships Kushner developed while in government.

Now back at the center of high-stakes diplomacy — negotiating ceasefires in Gaza, engaging in talks tied to Iran’s nuclear program, and participating in discussions related to Ukraine — he is simultaneously running a firm funded largely by the same governments whose interests intersect with US policy in the region.

Special envoy Steve Witkoff, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Jared Kushner attend a meeting with Ukrainian officials

For most of American history, the lines between public service and private profit have been clearly defined. Government officials disclose their finances, divest from conflicts, and step away from business interests that could cloud their judgment.

But Kushner is operating in a space where those lines have largely dissolved — and where the legal and ethical frameworks designed to enforce them are struggling to keep pace.

In February 2024, Kushner appeared at an event hosted by Axios. Asked whether accepting billions from Middle Eastern governments would complicate any future foreign policy role, he drew a clear line. “I’m an investor now,” he said. “I served in government. My track record was, I think, pretty impeccable. Now I’m a private investor.” Months later, he said he had already raised money ahead of the election in part to avoid future conflicts.

“We don’t have to raise capital for the next four years,” he said.

That separation proved short-lived. By early 2026, Kushner was back in the middle of high-stakes diplomacy — negotiating with Iranian officials, helping shape ceasefire efforts in Gaza, and engaging in Ukraine talks — even as reporting indicated he continued to seek additional capital for Affinity, including from existing Gulf investors.

When asked about the overlap, Kushner dismissed the concern. “What people call conflicts of interests,” he said in a 60 Minutes interview, “Steve [Witkoff] and I call experience and trusted relationships that we have throughout the world.”

Jared Kushner

How they got here

Kushner’s ability to raise capital traces back to the relationships he built in government.

Six months after leaving the White House, he launched Affinity Partners with little traditional private equity infrastructure — no established investment team, no track record of returns, and no portfolio of deals. What he did have was access.

In 2021, Kushner sought a $2 billion investment from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund, controlled by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. According to media reports, the fund’s advisory panel raised concerns about the proposal, citing the firm’s early operations, lack of experience, and asset management fee. The investment ultimately went forward after the crown prince intervened.

The decision underscored the degree to which Kushner’s value, at least in the eyes of investors, was tied not only to his business strategy but to “Affinity’s founders’ deep understanding of different government policies and geopolitical systems,” as a Public Investment Fund document put it.

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates followed with their own investments, bringing Affinity’s total capital to $4.8 billion — nearly all of it from three Gulf monarchies where Kushner now negotiates on behalf of the United States.

As for Witkoff, a New York real estate developer and longtime Trump associate, he follows a similar model — using relationships built through business for diplomatic access while maintaining financial interests that overlap with his government role.

Steve Witkoff

Witkoff had no diplomatic experience before being entrusted with sensitive foreign policy negotiations. His company has received significant financing from firms with ties to Middle Eastern sovereign wealth, including investors connected to Qatar.

Witkoff’s business ties extend to Russia as well. Witkoff’s company has received financing from firms with connections to Russian investment networks — the same sphere he was engaging with as a diplomat. In leaked phone conversations with Yuri Ushakov, a senior Russian foreign policy adviser, Witkoff appeared to coach Moscow on how to frame proposals favorably for Trump.

Why the arrangement works for Trump

To his supporters, Kushner’s relationships are precisely what make him effective as a diplomatic envoy. His approach, which is relatively unconstrained by diplomatic convention, allows him to move quickly, bypass institutional friction, and operate in spaces where traditional diplomacy can stall.

One European official involved in Ukraine discussions described Kushner as more engaged than others, noting that he appeared genuinely invested in the process. “He’s smart and he has a soul,” the official said.

President Trump has defended Kushner in similar terms, arguing that he “knows the region, knows the people, knows the players” — a reflection of the premium this White House places on familiarity and access over formal diplomatic experience.

The other side of the ledger

That effectiveness, however, comes with a tradeoff: the overlap between Kushner’s diplomatic role and his business interests is both an asset and perceived conflict of interest.

Take Gaza. After brokering the initial ceasefire, Kushner attended the World Economic Forum in Davos in January as part of the official US delegation. He unveiled a “master plan” for rebuilding Gaza that featured “amazing investment opportunities” in projects such as luxury high-rise towers and seaside resorts. Left unsaid: Kushner’s firm manages billions from the very Gulf governments that are expected to fund this reconstruction.

Jared Kushner at the Board of Peace signing ceremony at the World Economic Forum

Or consider Iran. In the days before the US launched its military campaign in February, Kushner was negotiating with Iranian officials. The talks failed. Days later, Trump said Kushner was one of a handful of top advisers who urged him to launch major combat operations.

Here’s the context: Saudi Arabia and Iran are regional rivals locked in a decades-long power struggle. The UAE is also concerned about Iranian influence. Both countries — Kushner’s largest investors — have an obvious strategic interest in seeing Iran’s military capabilities diminished. When the bombing began, Kushner returned to fundraising — meeting with Saudi officials about investing billions more in Affinity.

This isn’t proof that business ties influenced Kushner’s advice. But there is no way to know whether they did. When your biggest investors stand to benefit from the policies you are shaping, trust becomes difficult to build — even if decisions are made in good faith — and critics are likely to assume the worst. Rep. Jamie Raskin, the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, has launched a sweeping investigation of Kushner’s business interests, writing to Kushner that “you cannot faithfully represent the United States with billions in Saudi and Emirati cash burning a hole in every pocket of every suit you wear.” The Senate and House Committees on Finance opened their own probe, with one lawmaker warning that if Trump’s son-in-law is “getting influenced by cash from other countries, America’s national security is at risk.”

The constitutional question

The Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause bars anyone holding an office of trust from accepting benefits from foreign states without congressional approval. The Founders didn’t specifically imagine a scenario where the president’s son-in-law would simultaneously negotiate peace deals and raise billions from the governments on the other side of the table. But they understood the principle: when someone’s fortune depends on pleasing foreign powers, the public can’t trust that they’re putting America first.

The administration has at times argued that informal or advisory roles fall outside that framework. Then, in February, Trump named Kushner a special envoy for peace — a newly created position triggering a legal requirement to file a public financial disclosure within 30 days.

Witkoff submitted his disclosure. More than two months later, Kushner has not.

The incentives of peace

Kushner’s record reflects both the possibilities and the limits of his unique approach. He has created diplomatic openings that more traditional diplomacy often struggled to reach. But many of the conflicts he has helped negotiate — from Gaza to Ukraine to Iran — remain unresolved, unstable, or both.

Even so, the model endures because it reflects something deeper about how Trump views diplomacy itself: less as a structured process rooted in institutions and expertise than as a series of personal relationships, leverage points, and transactions.

In that system, access becomes its own form of authority. And the people closest to power are not just shaping American foreign policy. They are redefining who gets to conduct it — and who stands to benefit from it.